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Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog 







"How is the betting?" 
"Well, that is the curious part of it. You could have got fifteen to one yesterday, but the price 
has become shorter and shorter, until you can hardly get three to one now." 
"Hum!" said Holmes. "Somebody knows something, that is clear!" 
 
Inspector Gregory: "Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?" 
Holmes: "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time." 
"The dog did nothing in the nighttime" 
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes. 
 









This Essay briefly reexamines the great debates on the role of insider trading in the 
corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets, harm to individual 
investors, and executive compensation.  The focus is on the mystery of why trading by all 
kinds of insiders as well as knowledgeable outsiders was studiously ignored by the business 
and investment communities before the advent of insider trading regulation.  It is hardly 
conceivable that officers, directors, and controlling shareholders would have remained 
totally silent in the face of widespread insider trading if they had seen the practice as being 
harmful to the company, to themselves, or to investors.  By analogy with the famous article 
by Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, this Essay considers the problem of 
obtaining necessary information for managers of large corporate enterprises.  The 
suggested analytical framework views the share price, sensitively impacted by informed 
trading, as a mechanism for timely transmission of valuable information to top managers 
and large shareholders.  Informed trading in the stock market is also compared to 
“prediction” or “virtual” markets currently used by corporations and policymakers. 
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PART I – BACKGROUND 
 
It is almost 40 years since the publication of my book, Insider Trading and the Stock 
Market,
1 and the topic still has the ability to engender heated argument as well as 
seemingly unending efforts at analytical explication.
2  I apologize at the outset for 
continuing the debate, especially since I myself thought that it had about run its course.  
Nonetheless, the topic refuses to die, and it continues to stimulate new hypotheses, one 
of which is about to be offered. 
 
This taxing of the intellectual tolerance of critics of insider trading may have a 
redeeming feature for many.  In the process of developing this new idea, I have had to 
reexamine and substantially modify perhaps the most vigorously criticized claim I made 
for the positive benefits of unregulated insider trading.  That was the notion that insider 
trading can be used as an important component of executive compensation.  I hope that I 
am about to offer a much stronger substitute argument. 
 
Fundamentally, my book made only three basic economic arguments.
3  One was that the 
practice of insider trading did no significant harm to long-term investors.  The other two 
were claims of positive benefits from the practice, one, the compensation argument, and 
the other, the idea that insider trading contributed importantly to the efficiency of stock 
market pricing.  
 
By and large the idea that there is no direct harm from the practice has held up very 
well, especially the point that no real damage is caused to an investor who engages 
anonymously on an exchange in a trade with an insider on the other side of the  
                                                                  
1 HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). 
2 For an excellent though but already somewhat dated bibliography, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider 
Trading, in III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 772, 798-812 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit 
De Geest eds., 2000).  For the most comprehensive treatise, see WILLIAM  K.S. WANG  & MARC  I. 
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996 & Supp. 2002).  
3 This discussion leaves aside such tangential but important issues as the enforceability of insider trading 
laws and public choice aspects of the subject, as well as such tangential but economically irrelevant 
notions as the fairness of the practice.  
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transaction. However, one “harm” argument of feasible merit
4 has dominated the 
academic literature for some time.  This is the so-called “adverse selection” argument.  
Basically the argument is that, since specialists on the floor of stock exchanges (or other 
market makers) systematically lose money when insiders are trading, they will expand 
their bid-ask spread in order to cover this greater cost of doing business. In this fashion, 
it is argued, they pass along the cost of insiders’ trading to all outside investors with 
whom they deal, the so-called “insider trading tax.”
5 
 
The first part of this argument is really just a variant of the idea in my book that short-
term traders would indeed frequently lose to insiders
6 (a warning against using the stock 
market as a gambling casino).  I suggested that long-term investors
7 had little to worry 
about quantitatively because of insider trading, and the same thing remains true 
regardless of the existence of some adverse selection.  Furthermore, there is 
considerable evidence that the harm to market makers exists more in the theoretical 
world of finance literature than it does in the actual play of the market.  Though the 
argument is theoretically feasible, it seems to be practically irrelevant in the real world.
8  
 
Of the two arguments that I offered for positive benefits from insider trading, the 
argument for a strong positive relationship between market efficiency and insider 
trading has proved to be very robust. I missed the very important and related advantage 
pointed out by Harold Demsetz that access to valuable trading information may allow 
                                                                  
4 I do not consider the SEC’s “official” line on insider trading, that it destroys the confidence of investors 
and thus lessens both liquidity and investment, to have serious merit.  Apart from being a nearly 
unfalsifiable proposition, it is devoid of the scantest economic or empirical content.  It has, however, been 
enormously important in the propaganda campaign the SEC has waged for years to demonize insider 
trading. 
5 Walter Bagehot (pseud. for Jack L. Treynor), The Only Game in Town, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.–Apr. 
1971, at 12; Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 
1457 (1983); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist 
Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985). 
6 Perhaps in some sense long-term traders lose as well, but quantitatively that is insignificant as compared 
to short-termers, and even then one must look at various offsetting advantages. See also Henry G. Manne, 
In Defense of Insider Trading, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1966, at 113, 114-15. 
7 This refers to investors whose trades represent fundamentally a rebalancing of diversified portfolios to 
reflect changed circumstances or altered weightings in a previously correctly balanced portfolio. 
8 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of Adverse 
Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83 (2004).  One of the most telling criticisms of the 
adverse selection argument is that liquidity providers themselves – including the NYSE specialists and 
the NASDAQ dealers (but with the exception of liquidity providers in options markets) – are not 
generally concerned about the presence of insiders in stocks in which they make a market. Id. at 108-10, 
136-144.  
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controlling shareholders to be compensated for the additional risk they assumed by not 
being well diversified.
9  This is an especially important factor in corporate governance, 
since, without a controlling shareholder, agency costs in large corporations, normally 
dealt with through an exogenous market for corporate control, will be much higher.  
 
There is almost no disagreement that insider trading does always push the price of a 
stock in the correct direction.
10  This is not to gainsay that there are also other 
mechanisms that play a significant role in stock pricing, such as the explicit public 
disclosure of new information, sanctioned transmittal of information to financial 
 
                                                                  
9See Harold Demsetz, Corporate Control, Insider Trading and Rates of Return, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 313 (1986).  It is appropriate to note that controlling shareholders perform a valuable 
management-monitoring function not shouldered by others shareholders, whose incentive would be to 
free ride (the ultimate “separation” problem).  Demsetz, however, may have overlooked the extent to 
which a control block of shares presents agency cost problems of its own, since there are other devices 
besides inside information by which a controlling shareholder may transfer wealth from minority 
shareholders. 
10 For empirical research arguing that insider trading quickly incorporates the impact of nonpublic 
information into the market price, see Ji-Chai Lin & Michael S. Rozeff, The Speed of Adjustment of 
Prices to Private Information: Empirical Tests, 18 J. FIN. RES. 143 (1995); Lisa K. Meulbroek, An 
Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661 (1992). The only significant arguments are 
with the extent and timeliness of a price effect from insider trading. See Sugato Chakravarty & John J. 
McConnell, Does Insider Trading Really Move Stock Prices?, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 191 
(1999) (offering empirical evidence for the proposition that informed trading by insiders has the same 
price impact as uninformed trading by outsiders); James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A 
Critical Response to the “Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 646 (arguing that insider trading is a 
“noisy” device for communicating the stock value).  Research with “laboratory” experiments suggests 
that inside information is rapidly assimilated into market price and that this may occur even with very few 
insiders participating in the market, a finding particularly relevant here.  See, e.g., Martin Barner et al., On 
the Microstructure of Price Determination and Information Aggregation with Sequential and Asymmetric 
Information Arrival in an Experimental Asset Market, 1 ANNALS FIN. 1 (2005); Daniel Friedman et al., 
The Informational Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 349 (1984); Charles R. 
Plott & Shyam Sunder, Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An 
Application of Rational-Expectations Models, 90 J. POL. ECON. 663 (1982).  But see Vernon L. Smith et 
al.,  Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56 
ECONOMETRICA 1119 (1988).  
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analysts, and the so-called “derivative” trading that occurs after some form of market 
 “signaling.”
11 A vast literature has developed examining the relative impact of these 
various mechanisms on stock market pricing, but it is fair to say that none of this has 
seriously damaged the argument of the stock-pricing benefit of insider trading.  This is 
not the right time or place to review that literature, and for present purposes we merely 
need to understand that insider trading does have the price vector claimed for it, even 
though this mechanism alone may play less than an exclusive role in making stock 
market pricing as efficient as it is.
12  The crucial point for present purposes is that, even 
if only on a few occasions and either by itself or in tandem with other forces, insider 
trading may be sufficient to move the price of a company’s stock. 
 
My second “positive” argument for insider trading, that it could perform well as a part 
of an executive compensation package, has been the more forcefully attacked,
13 and it is 
                                                                  
11 The standard reference for this discussion is Ronald J. Gilson & Rainier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). Without getting into too much detail, there 
are two significant weaknesses in Gilson and Kraakman’s implicit effort to minimize the role of insider 
trading in this process.  One is their failure to reckon with the price influence of insiders’ refraining from 
buying or selling when they have undisclosed information.  The other is a certain ambiguity in the 
concept of “derivative” trading, since it would seem that most of this trading must actually follow actual 
informed trading, including especially insiders’ trades.  Thus they implicitly underestimated the relative 
influence of insider trading in making the stock market efficient.  That particular ambiguity is gone in the 
recent update of their piece, Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003), but there is still no 
emphasis put on this fairly obvious feature of market efficiency.  This article gives more significance than 
is due to the impact on market efficiency of behavioral finance and the cognitive bias it posits with noise 
trading (as if all noise trading was not always seen as a kind of economic irrationality).  And they give far 
less significance than is due to the market inefficiencies created by various bits of securities regulation, 
though they do emphasize the special problem of the federal securities law’s bias against short selling.  
Unfortunately that is not the only or even the most significant interference with market efficiency to be 
found in our complex securities regulations.  
12 An argument could be made, of course, that all price changes result from new information that someone 
has traded on profitably.  The impact of explicit disclosure is often to confirm that the price reached in 
other ways is correct.  But this argument still allows explicit disclosure an important role in making stock 
market pricing efficient. 
13 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 593 (2002) (insider trading creates the 
incentive for managers to disclose information prematurely ); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE 
LAW 273-74 (1986) (insider trading allows managers to determine their own compensation packages and 
undo formal compensation agreements); Cox, supra note 10, at 651-52 (insider trading is likely to 
increase managers’ tolerance of bad news); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332 (insider trading 
may induce managers to accept excessively risky projects; insider trading as managerial compensation 
may be inefficient, as risk-averse managers would value trading profits differently than risk-neutral 
shareholders); Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large 
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982) (insider trading is likely to interfere with the flow of 
information within the firm); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading 
and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1448-50 (1967) (insider trading is likely to induce managers 
to delay disclosure and participate in market manipulation).  
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perhaps less robust than I and other proponents
14 had originally assumed.  The insider-
trading compensation argument has become especially relevant in recent years,
15 as a 
great debate has swirled through business, regulatory, and legal circles about the proper 
way to compensate corporate executives.  Much of this discussion has focused recently 
on stock options, since they were so heavily relied upon to compensate employees of 
the firms that figured heavily in the market collapse of the early 2000’s.  The focus on 
stock options in turn logically implicates the insider trading compensation argument, 
since the two are undoubtedly the closest substitutes in the compensation arena. 
 
A stock option offers the same incentive to employees to work efficiently that would be 
provided by ownership of an appropriate number of shares, however obtained, but 
leveraged by non-recourse, interest-free debt. The indirect incentive effects of this 
leveraging are very difficult to value for corporate accounting purposes or, for that 
matter, for the purpose of determining the value of the option to an employee.
16  Thus, 
even though there are a forward look and a leverage feature to options that cannot be 
obtained, say, with bonuses, there are still real problems with determining the exact 
incentive effect of stock option grants.
17  
 
After the option is exercised, and to the extent the employee holds on to the shares, the 
executive becomes a (larger) shareholder.  Stock ownership obviously motivates a 
manager to maximize share price, especially if the shares represent a substantial part of 
                                                                  
14 See especially Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 857 (1983). 
15 See Henry G. Manne, Options? Nah. Try Insider Trading., WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, at A8. 
16 The corporation’s valuation of the same option may be quite different from that of the employee, as the 
debate about the FASB’s recent requirement that the options be valued as an expense on the corporate 
books well attests.  See  FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS  BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL  ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS  NO. 123, SHARE-BASED  PAYMENT  (rev. Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf (last visited ___). See also Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock 
Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 (2002) (arguing that the option’s cost to 
the company “often significantly exceeds the value of the option from the perspective of a risk-averse, 
undiversified executive who can neither sell the option nor hedge against its risk”). 
17 MICHAEL C. JENSEN & KEVIN J. MURPHY, REMUNERATION: WHERE WE HAVE BEEN, HOW WE GOT TO 
HERE, WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS, AND HOW TO FIX THEM (Harvard Bus. Sch., NOM Research Paper No. 
04-28, 2004), available at  http://www.ssrn.com/Abstract=561305  (last visited ___);  Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1901 (2001); David Yermack, Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?, 39 J. FIN. 
ECON. 237 (1995); David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News 
Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997).  
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the employee’s portfolio.  However, since the shares will represent only a tiny fraction 
of the company’s outstanding shares, for familiar free-rider reasons, the induced 
incentive for risky choices may still fall short of what would be dictated by the interest 
of all shareholders.  In other words, as a number of studies suggest, stock options at best 
offer no greater incentive than would an appropriate, but difficult to determine, number 
of shares held by the manager, however acquired, and leveraged by debt.
18  At worst 
they may provide real adverse incentives.
19 
 
When stock options are the primary device used to encourage risky decisions by 
managers, and to the extent that insider trading is effectively, or even substantially, 
prevented, the financial focus of corporate officials will necessarily be on accounting 
information, since the real world events underlying those entries cannot be traded on 
directly as they occur.  The legal flow of information to the market will be via formal, 
SEC-sanctioned disclosures, including press releases, quarterly reports, 10-K’s, and 
duly publicized conferences with financial analysts. Since future expected profits cannot 
be shown on the books, and trading on the underlying information is not allowed, the 
urge to make the accounting picture look better in order to have it conform to 
management’s current view of the company’s prospects – biased or not – may become 
irresistible.  It is at least arguable that this constituted part of the underlying pressure for 
what occurred at Enron and various telecommunications companies.
20 
 
                                                                  
18 It is not surprising that the empirical studies of the incentive effects of options show a mixed bag.  This 
device is arguably most useful in companies with executives who might have difficulty borrowing 
sufficient money to leverage their own purchases of their companies’ shares, as may have been 
particularly the case with many high-tech start-up companies in recent years. 
19 See  MICHAEL  C. JENSEN, STOCK  OPTIONS  REWARD  MANAGEMENT FOR DESTROYING  VALUE AND 
WHAT TO DO  ABOUT  IT (Harvard Bus. Sch., NOM Research Paper No. 01-27, 2001); available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/Abstract=480401 (last visited ___). 
20 This is not an excuse for illegal and fraudulent behavior, but it does reveal a type of unanticipated 
consequence of securities regulation that rarely figures in the calculus of whether that regulation is 
desirable or not.  One can compare this notion to what Michael Jensen terms the problem of “overvalued 
equity.”  See Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of 
Corporate Finance, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549 (2004).  
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Insider trading on the other hand does not have these disadvantages.  It in effect allows 
insiders meticulously to craft their own reward for innovations almost as soon as they 
occur and to trade without harm to any investors.
21  The incentive is immediate and 
precise and is never confounded with stock price changes that are not of the managers’ 
making.  
 
If insider trading were legal and used to replace stock options, there would be no 
“tragedies” of employees being left high and dry with options way out of the money. 
There would be no loss of reward when an innovation merely resulted in a reduction of 
an expected loss.  There would be no unearned gain because a company’s stock 
appreciates in line with a market or industry rise.  There would be no disappointments 
about the number of shares optioned or granted to particular employees.  There would 
be none of this absurd business of renegotiating the option plan every time the stock 
takes a nosedive.  And there would be no peculiar problems of accounting, since there 
would be no reason to put the right of employees to trade on undisclosed information on 
the company’s balance sheet at all: such trading would be entirely extraneous to the 
company’s accounts. 
 
The SEC’s notoriously ineffective but highly publicized and politicized efforts to 
enforce insider trading laws have merely shifted the identity of the people who may 
trade first on undisclosed information.
22  In the process they have perhaps prevented the 
                                                                  
21 A clear statement on this proposition was provided by Carlton and Fischel: 
 
Insider trading may present a solution to [the] cost-of-renegotiation dilemma. The 
unique advantage of insider trading is that it allows a manager to alter his compensation 
package in light of new knowledge, thereby avoiding continual renegotiation. The 
manager . . . in effect "renegotiates" each time he trades. This in turn increases the 
manager's incentive to acquire and develop valuable information in the first place (as 
well as to invest in firm-specific human capital). 
 
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 14, at 870-71.  The point about “no harm to investors” does not mean that 
short-term traders (really gamblers) or market makers trading against insiders will not lose money.  They 
will, though they will only lose negligibly more than they would if insiders were not in the market but the 
price level change (or the release time of new information) was the same. 
22 David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an 
Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987) (arguing that the existence of 
insider trading regulation benefited “market professionals” in the securities industry).  Compare this to the 
problem addressed by Regulation FD which prohibited the practice of selective disclosure by issuers to 
securities analysts and large shareholders. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000).  
  8
development of an innovative and useful compensation device and unduly encouraged a 
problematic second best. 
 
Having said that, however, it must be recognized that insider trading cannot be a perfect 
form of incentive compensation.  While many of the criticisms of the practice are 
vacuous or even tendentious, there are significant problems with the scheme which 
many of my critics hastened to elaborate.  Valuable information will undoubtedly get 
into the hands of individuals inside and outside the company who in no sense should be 
compensated, usually because they will have done nothing to produce the valuable new 
information.
23  Another problem is that the value of the information cannot be metered 
to the value of the contribution of a particular individual.  And, as was also pointed out, 
the value of new information will in many cases be a function of the financial ability of 
someone to trade on the information or of their ability to evaluate new knowledge.
24 
 
Perhaps the most common objection to insider trading as compensation is that it cannot 
be metered in advance as part of a compensation plan.
25  It is in its very nature a kind of 
all or nothing proposition, since efforts by a given corporation to police its rules about 
who can trade, and to what extent, will necessarily involve the company in exactly the 
kind of post hoc compensation calculations that the practice is argued by its supporters 
to avoid.
26  It is not too surprising then that, even in the heyday of insider trading in the 
                                                                  
23 This argument, like the ones to follow, necessarily reflects only a partial equilibrium conclusion.  There 
are many other positive points that must be included in a general equilibrium solution.  
24 Morris Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470, 488 
(1969); Schotland, supra note 13, at 1455. 
25 This criticism may not be quite a forceful as it first appears.  If one would grant the distinction I 
referred to in my book between managers and entrepreneurs, there is still much vitality left in the 
information-as-compensation argument.  A problem in this connection with this otherwise valuable 
economic concept of the entrepreneur, however, is that it allows little useful application since one can 
never know ahead of time who in a large company will be the real entrepreneur.  Thus insider trading has 
to be allowed either for all or for none; there is no middle ground.  While, for a variety of reasons, I 
would still conclude that non-regulation is the best solution, I would not deny some force to the argument 
of those who came down on the other side of the compensation argument. 
26 The difficulty of individual company’s policing insider trading (assuming that the company thought 
there was something harmful in the practice) was one basis for Judge Easterbrook’s conclusion that the 
practice should be outlawed and policed (efficiently? and at what other costs?) by public authorities, 
something of a non-sequitur, since there is no evidence that any company ever actually faced this 
problem.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: 
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81, 93-95 (John W. Pratt & Richard. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).  
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United States before 1968,
27 no company ever announced that certain executives, but 
not other employees, would be allowed to engage in the practice.
28 
 
Indeed it is not surprising that there is no evidence that any company ever tried to 
develop insider trading as an explicit and integral part of an optimal compensation 
package.  On the other hand, our understanding of corporate inaction on insider trading 
as compensation tells us nothing about the far more startling fact that very few 
companies in the United States, prior to the SEC’s involvement with the subject, seemed 
to have had a rule against insider trading.
29  And, perhaps even more surprising, there is 
no significant or convincing evidence of which I am aware that any company or its 
spokespersons or large shareholders ever pushed for public regulation of insider trading 
when it was surely widely known that it was going on.
30  The pre-Texas Gulf Sulphur 
business community was perhaps understandably silent about insider trading as a 
compensation device, since it probably was not really a feasible practice, but they were 
also – far more mysteriously – silent about any problems they might have found 
generally with the very common practice of insider trading.  That is precisely the 
mystery which can now be solved with a little help from the “dog that did not bark.” 
 
                                                                  
27 The first significant judicial holding that insider trading was generally a violation of Rule 10b-5 was 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 
(1971). However, SEC’s warnings certainly appeared earlier. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 
907 (1961). 
28 I have for years labored – and pressured students – to come up with the outline of a workable 
compensation plan utilizing insider trading.  But, given the constraints implied by the discussion in the 
text, this has proved to be a fruitless task. 
29  See A DOLF  A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER  C. MEANS, THE  MODERN  CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 327 (1932) (“It is known that certain companies, usually under the dominance of some strong 
individuals, decline to permit anyone . . . whether as director or employee to conduct speculative 
operations in the corporate stock.  On the other hand, it is certain that this is not the general practice . . . 
.”) 
30 An interesting bit of support for the notion that there was no concern about the “evils” of insider trading 
comes from the fact that, as late as 1939, the New York Stock Exchange and other leading exchanges, 
proposed that Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the only provision thought to 
relate even modestly to insider trading, be repealed. Text of Exchanges’ Proposals to SEC, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 15, 1939, at 11. But see infra note 32.  
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PART II – THE MYSTERY 
 
It is hardly conceivable that officers, directors and controlling shareholders, would have 
remained totally silent in the face of widespread insider trading if they had seen the 
practice as being harmful to the company, to themselves, or to investors. And it is 
equally inconceivable that they would not have recognized some harm if it existed. 
Insider trading must have been as much a way of life in the U.S. securities markets prior 
to the 1960’s as it is known to have been at a much later date in Japan and other 
countries.  Its existence was so common and taken for granted that there was no need 
for empirical or even anecdotal evidence for the practice.
31   
 
And yet no one of significance in the business world was ever heard to complain about 
the practice or much less to declare it to be the moral equivalent of murder or rape in the 
commercial arena.
32  This silence is a mystery that has not been noticed or addressed by 
                                                                  
31 Classic histories include HENRY CLEWS, FIFTY YEARS IN WALL STREET (1908) and EDWIN LEFÈVRE, 
REMINISCENCES OF A STOCK OPERATOR (1923).  For evidence of contemporary practices in Japan and 
elsewhere, see Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75 
(2002); Jan Hanousek & Richard Podpiera, Information-Driven Trading at the Prague Stock Exchange: 
Evidence from Intra-Day Data, 10 ECON. TRANSITION 747 (2002); Richard Small, From Tatemae to 
Honne: A Historical Perspective on the Prohibition of Insider Trading in Japan, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 313 (2003). 
32 There are a few exceptions, primarily academic, more notable as proof of the proposition in the text 
than for suggesting popular revulsion about the practice such as we find today. See BERLE & MEANS, 
supra note 29, at 223-26, 326 (condemning insider trading as an abuse of access to information in the 
official capacity and treating inside information as the collective property of the shareholders); FRANK P. 
SMITH, MANAGEMENT  TRADING: STOCK-MARKETS  PRICES AND PROFITS  (1941) (applying economic 
analysis to trading by corporate insiders but ultimately condemning insider trading on nonpublic 
information); H.L. Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 
MICH. L. REV. 267, 297 (1910) (arguing that insider trading “does more to discourage legitimate 
investment in corporate shares than almost anything else”).  More to the point, the Pujo Bill, a 
comprehensive federal securities statute proposed in 1913 after well-publicized congressional hearings, 
had a provision regulating trading by corporate officers and directors.  H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 171-72 
(1913).  There were even business witnesses who criticized the practice of insider trading (but did not 
endorse the proposed regulatory measures) during the subsequent Senate hearings in 1914.  See 
Regulation of the Stock Exchange: Hearings on S. 3895 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 63d Cong. 152-53, 267-68 (1914).  But this was not the central theme of the hearings, and 
nothing came of the provision regulating insider trading.  Again, the failure of any follow-up or of any 
increased concern after the hearings seems to strengthen the point that there was no serious public 
concern with insider trading prior to Texas Gulf Sulphur. 
Perhaps the same can be said about the “minority” common law view that insider trading was improper 
(though no early case even involved an anonymous transaction on an exchange).  See W ANG  & 
STEINBERG, supra note 2, §16.2.3.2. 
Admittedly, Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was sold to the public as an anti-
insider trading provision, but its reach was so limited, that it was never thought of as a comprehensive 
effort to deal with the subject.  Even so, the New York Stock Exchange sought repeal of that provision 
only a few years later. See supra note 30.  
  11
modern writers – until now.  What can possibly explain this puzzling behavior?   
Perhaps the practice was thought, as it is today, to be so heinous that no one wanted 
even to mention it in polite company, as the words “cancer” or “incest” used to be 
treated.  But there is little evidence that prior to the SEC’s efforts in this regard, insider 
trading had anything like the connotation of extreme immorality implied by this theory. 
There is no evidence of any general revulsion by the business community or the public 
towards insider trading in those “good old days”. 
 
One might argue that the adoption of the securities laws of the New Deal, with their 
ostensible “full disclosure” philosophy, reflected a general dissatisfaction with the state 
of affairs in securities markets, including insider trading.  But this would be a serious 
misreading of that history, since that legislation, like most other New Deal regulation, 
was aimed primarily at preventing or suppressing competition, regardless of what 
incidental rationalization may have been offered the public for political reason.
33 
 
And while it is true that there would have been considerable “free rider” problems if any 
one company had tried to enforce a rule against insider trading, again this would not 
explain the universal silence on the subject.  Indeed, if this were part of the explanation, 
it is much more likely that we would have heard a public clamor for government 
assistance with the problem rather than total silence. 
 
It might be argued that, while there was universal disapproval of insider trading, the 
managers, who were the chief perpetrators, would naturally keep silent about their 
transactions.  This explanation would apply equally to all top managers, board members 
and controlling shareholders, and thus it could theoretically explain the universal silence 
on the subject.  But this hypothesis is flawed.  Top managers or controlling shareholders 
could not have been the only individuals with access to undisclosed information, and 
                                                                  
33 See ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966). Hawley found a real 
anti-competition motive but a different, publicly stated purpose, in connection with the creation of every 
New Deal agency except the SEC.  The exception Hawley thought he found was clearly an error. See also 
Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL 
STREET IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21, 31-36 (Henry G. 
Manne & Ezra Solomon eds., 1974) (discussing possible anticompetitive motives and consequences of 
the federal securities laws); Henry G. Manne & Joseph J. Bial, Questioning the SEC’s Crusades, 
REGULATION, Winter 2001, at 8 (hypothesizing a restraint-of-competition motive behind the SEC’s initial 
sally into the subject of insider trading in the 1960’s).  
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they would have no reason to “cover up” the trading of others.  Accountants would have 
valuable financial information before the CFO; salespeople and plant foremen would 
know of speed-ups in orders and production before the COO; and outsiders would know 
of pending merger offers before the CEO.  Even mid-level executives, to say nothing of 
secretaries, elevator operators, and office boys, would certainly on occasion have had 
access to tradable information.  Anyone might indeed have had some reason to remain 
silent about his or her own trading, but that would not explain the silence of the top 
managers about underlings’ trades. 
 
Or consider the matter of trading on bad news by various employees of a company.  
One would expect top managers to scream like stuck pigs if underlings traded on 
information which the superiors did not yet have and which would lower stock price.  
Such behavior could jeopardize managers’ own job security.  It is conventional wisdom 
that top managers of publicly-held companies do everything they can to put a rosy hue 
on any public disclosures and even on the company’s financial accounting.  Clearly, 
their interest in survival, as affected by the impact of bad news on the share price, would 
prevail over any wish to hush up insider trading by others.  Thus we could hardly expect 
that to explain their total silence on the subject, since, in this case, insider trading might 
be harmful to them. 
 
But what if the top managers were making so much money from trading on undisclosed 
information themselves that they were willing to acquiesce in underlings’ participation 
in order to avoid killing the gold-bearing goose?  This too fails on close examination.  
Top managers may well have had access to some valuable information before its trading 
value was frittered away by underlings, but controlling shareholders who were not 
directly involved in the management of the company would not. If they were being cut 
out by their managers, there is no reason to believe that they would not complain about 
it or at least cite it as a reason for putting in new managers.  Of course, they too could 
all have been part of an enormous conspiracy of silence,
34 but the odds are strongly 
against that.   
                                                                  
34 For the farfetched plea for regulating insider trading to prevent managers from using inside information 
to “bribe” dominant shareholders to refrain from monitoring (certainly a kind of conspiracy theory), see 
Ernst Maug, Insider Trading Legislation and Corporate Governance, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1569 (2002).  
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So it is highly unlikely that corporate managers of the relevant period thought there was 
a problem with the practice at all.  On the other hand, if some (net) advantage to the 
practice existed of which managers then were even dimly aware, then their silence 
might well imply approval of the practice.  Recognition of some benefit to insider 
trading would still not necessarily result in public discussion of the topic.  Silence might 
still follow because there was no market pressure, and no social, intellectual, or 
psychological incentive, to open the issue publicly.  If any disadvantage from insider 
trading had been recognized by important business spokespersons of the day, silence 
would have been unlikely. Conversely silence could well have been the consequence of 
approval.
35  Our remaining task then is to see if there was some benefit to the 
managerial function from insider trading other than the compensation argument which 
we have already discounted. 
 
                                                                  
35 We have already mentioned that it is highly unlikely that they were merely unaware of the practice or 
that they could not recognize either an advantage or disadvantage from it.  
  14
PART III – THE MYSTERY SOLVED 
 
One possible solution to this query is suggested by a surprising source, Friedrich 
Hayek’s classic The Use of Knowledge in Society.
36  In that piece Hayek advances the 
notion that the most important task of an economic system is not the efficient allocation 
of goods and services.  If the necessary knowledge of relative values were available, 
those calculations would not in theory be difficult.  Though these observations are made 
in the context of a discussion of central economic planning, his language, as we shall 
see, seems equally applicable to some of the problems of managing a large corporate 
enterprise.  
 
The real problem for the socialist planner, as Hayek identified it, is how to manage the 
necessary information in practice, since “the knowledge of circumstance . . . never 
exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete 
and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”
37  
Hayek’s argument that “[t]he various ways in which the knowledge on which people 
base their plans is communicated to them is the crucial problem for any theory 
explaining the economic process”
38 applies equally well to the problem of managing a 
large corporation. In other words the essence of management is not the substance of the 
information needed for decisions but rather the process by which information which is 
somewhere “out there” gets communicated to the decision maker. 
 
Hayek compared “central planning,” which, “by its nature cannot take direct account of 
. . . circumstances of time and place” to “decentralized competition,” in which the 
decisions are left to “the man on the spot.”
39  The parallels to the managerial problem 
are very suggestive even if not exact.  Top-level managers are regularly beset with 
enormous problems of getting appropriate, truthful, and timely information for making 
                                                                  
36 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
37 Id. at 519. 
38 Id. at 520.  Hayek makes a distinction between scientific knowledge and the kind of knowledge of the 
“particular circumstances of time and place” which by its nature cannot enter into statistics such as a 
central planner would need, id. at 524, or, it might be argued, into accounting data of the sort to which the 
SEC gives preeminence. 
39 Id.  
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decisions,
40 decisions which in many particulars are similar to those a central economic 
planner would have to make.  And, while the corporate manager, unlike the central 
planner, cannot leave decisions up to “the man on the spot,” Hayek’s euphemism for a 
market process, the manager may have access to a related type of information source 
unavailable to the socialist planner.   
 
Information comes to top managers, of course, in many forms and through various 
devices.  From within the company, the decision-makers might receive accounting and 
statistical data and written and oral reports from subordinates.  From outside the 
company, the managers might enlist various kinds of consultants, auditors, or attorneys.  
Information can also be gleaned from public disclosures, paid informants, or even 
books.  But even assuming (a real stretch to be sure) the correctness and the relevance 
of all information obtained through these devices, one critical failing will be found in 
every one of them.  Anything other than information based on first-hand experience (a 
very limited possibility) will necessarily be somewhat “stale.” This is not to 
deemphasize the fact that much of the information will be erroneous, irrelevant, and/or 
biased.  It is merely to point out that no matter how correct the substance of the 
information, it will always take time for it to reach the decision maker, a delay that in 
some cases can prove fatal.  Information of this sort will always lack the immediacy of 




For Hayek, the solution in the case of economic organization was for diffused decision 
makers to utilize the market price of a commodity in their decisions, since that price 
contained significant information that diffused individual (private) planners need in 
order to make intelligent decisions. The price of a good or service or commodity was 
always immediately available and, as a guide to individual choice, inherently correct.
42   
 
                                                                  
40 For a brief summary of the types of information-transmission problems corporate managers confront, 
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational Failures 
Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1013-14 (1998).  But the “management” literature on the subject of 
information flows to decision-makers is enormous, clearly reflecting the seriousness of the problem.   
41 Hayek, supra note 36, at 524. 
42 Id. at 526.  
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But obviously the manager is not a central economic planner, and diffused competition 
is not usually a feasible alternative way to organize the administration of a single firm.  
Nonetheless, suggestive similarities remain.  As Hayek showed, “The most significant 
fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little 
the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action.”
43 
 
Consider the plight of a top manager of a corporation considering the expansion of a 
major division of the company.  He has probably received rosy reports about the 
division’s performance even though, perhaps contemporaneously, the price of the 
company’s stock is in sharp decline.  We will make the simplifying assumption that all 
other divisions are known to be steady and the general business conditions have not 
changed.
44  Clearly that manager has some unbiased information that things are not all 
they appear in his reports to be, and prudence dictates finding out what is really wrong 
with that division before approving the expansion.
45   
 
A scenario like that would not be realistic unless someone with information more 
reliable than that given to the top executives was trading in the company’s stock.  The 
manager would not care who got that information or how that person procured it; he 
would not care whether the trader was an insider or an outsider.  He would not care 
whether the person was a file clerk or an investment banker.  What would be important 
is, first, to stop the planned expansion; second, to find out what was wrong with the 
division; third to fix the problem; and possibly a fourth, take steps to deal with the 
producers of the erroneous reports.  Each of these represents an important managerial 
                                                                  
43 Id. at 526-27.  “The marvel is that . . . without an order being issued, without perhaps more than a 
handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained 
by months or investigation, are made to use the material or its products more sparingly; i.e., they move in 
the right direction.” Id. at 527. 
44 This example incidentally strongly supports the use of so-called “tracking” stocks to aid in corporate 
management.  For an example of exactly this scenario, see Joel T. Harper & Jeff Madura, Sources of 
Hidden Value and Risk Within Tracking Stock, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 2002, at 91.  But the scenario, and 
the others following, is much closer to the ideas implicit in the modern theory of “prediction” markets, the 
creation of virtual markets in almost any kind of future state.  The system has until recently been used 
primarily to make election outcome predictions, but it is increasingly finding a place in the corporate 
world.  See infra notes 54-55. 
45 See James B. Kau et al., Do Managers Listen to the Market?, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION (forthcoming 
2005) (offering empirical evidence that managers “listen to the market,” as they are more likely to cancel 
investments or merger plans when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement).  
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Or consider a manager faced with a well-publicized acquisition decision and a stock 
price that has declined more than such an acquisition should occasion.  He should 
recheck all the numbers and pause before completing the acquisition.  Any other course 
threatens serious litigation, or worse, later on.  The information being impacted into the 
share’s price may have come from insiders or outsiders, but, in any event, someone is 
betting their own money on the validity of numbers quite different than those the 
executive has been given.
47 There is great peril in ignoring such information.
48 
 
An additional scenario involves a situation that must be common in high-tech fields or 
others with rapidly changing technology.  Suppose that a publicly traded company is 
riding high with a dominant product in its particular market but not a product that is 
fully protected by its patents against substitutes.  Orders are high, earnings estimates are 
generous, morale among employees is good, consumer response is enthusiastic, and the 
managers are about to cash in on their stock options.  Just then, for no reason known to 
the company’s top management, the stock plummets.  It is in fact being shorted
49 by 
employees of another company which has developed a far superior substitute product.
50  
 
                                                                  
46 The prototypical New Yorker cartoon of a mogul watching the ticker tape in his office implied that he 
was “playing the market” on company time. But the grain of truth in the office presence of a ticker tape 
had to be that the top manager was watching primarily his own company’s stock price. 
47 Yuanzhi Luo, Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions, 60 J. FIN. 
(forthcoming 2005) (offering empirical evidence that market reaction to an M&A announcement predicts 
whether the companies later consummate the deal and that merging companies appear to extract 
information from the market reaction and later consider it in closing the deal). 
48 Or, it might be added, in not having it available because insider trading laws have prevented someone 
with the relevant information from trading or disseminating the information.  But I digress; the point of 
the text is merely that the stock market may convey valuable managerial information either not available 
or not available in timely fashion anywhere else.  A manager might be at some pains to preserve such a 
valuable source of information and, to repeat the point of the text, not be heard to complain that someone 
has “immorally” traded on inside information. 
49 The feasibility of short-selling and the existence of options or futures markets generally improve the 
process of aggregating information by allowing more individuals to profit on their information and 
making the market for the underlying security more “complete” and hence more efficient. See Stephen 
Figlewski & Gwendolyn P. Webb, Options, Short Sales, and Market Completeness, 48 J. FIN. 761 (1993). 
50 While there is a great debate as to whether this trading would run afoul of Rule 10b-5 – it is not trading 
by an insider trading in the usual sense – this example nonetheless still serves to make the point about 
managers being dependent on stock prices for information they may be unable to secure elsewhere. See 
also Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2001).  
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Or consider a case of substantial embezzlement and accounting fraud.  Top managers 
notice an otherwise mysterious decline in stock price.  This can set off alarms that 
ultimately lead to discovery of the fraud.  But why did the stock price decline?   
Obviously someone in the know about the fraud decided that stock trading profits were 
better than the “honor” of whistle-blowing, and, at least this way, other employees of 
the company may never know who the “snitch” was, thus avoiding various personal 
embarrassment and recriminations.  But why would the top managers care who did the 
trading or even how those traders knew about the fraud?  That knowledge would not be 
required (nor cheap to acquire) before the managers could take necessary corrective 
action. 
 
This example suggests a more general use of stock price in the day-to-day work of top 
administrators.  If the managers could assume that informed trading was taking place 
whenever it became profitable – in other words, if managers had acted as though the 
stock market were “efficient” long before the idea of an efficient market was articulated 
– they could also have used stock price changes as a kind of confirmation, albeit 
“noisy,” of their own internal financial and other reports.  In other words, general 
insider trading would go a long way towards keeping various functionaries on their toes 
and honest, since every major error or act of dishonesty would become a potential 




That last idea in turn suggests yet another reason for silence about insider trading, this 
time by controlling shareholders.  The problem of monitoring non-controlling managers 
was certainly recognized by investors and entrepreneurs long before Berle and Means 
popularized the notion of a separation of ownership and control. Manifestly, no agency 
relationship of this kind is feasible without some device for monitoring the quality of 
                                                                  
51 It goes without saying that we are discussing those cases in which the trading is sufficient to move the 
price of the company’s shares.  This implicates the great debate about the effectiveness of insider trading 
to move share prices.  The emerging consensus in the literature seems to be that this mechanism functions 
rapidly with few trades by insiders necessary to create a substantial movement in the indicated direction.  
See supra note 10.  Probably this effect would vary with the size and liquidity of the market for the 
particular company’s shares, the number of analysts following the shares, and other factors.  But the fact 
that the scheme may not function well to solve every managerial information problem is clearly no reason 
for not allowing it generally for those situations in which it is useful.  
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work done by the agents.  Are large investors who do not directly manage their 
companies merely to wait until they receive obscure quarterly or annual financials 
before making decisions about the quality of their managers?  And even if they serve or 
have representatives on the board, can they be assured of speedy and correct 
information about the real value of managerial decision making?  This is the agency 
cost problem par excellence, and a feasible solution is to allow, nay encourage, insider 
trading in order to assure as fast and accurate conveyance of information as possible via 
stock price.
52   
 
One would guess that these investors would want every bit of market price information 
they could possibly get, whether it came from stock trading by insiders or by the devil.  
With all the difficulties non-managing shareholders will have in securing adequate 
information to protect their investment, it certainly comes as no surprise to learn that 
large shareholders are rarely heard to complain about insider trading.  What is more 
surprising is that they and others with concurrent interests did not mount a more 
successful effort to thwart the SEC’s campaign against the practice.
53    
 
The various examples given above help explain why managers and others could have 
been expected to remain silent about insider trading in its heyday.  But these same 
scenarios are also significant because today they could represent actual corporate 
experiments with so-called “virtual” or “prediction” markets.
54 These schemes typically 
                                                                  
52 This insight makes particularly ironic that Berle and Means complained that managers of large 
corporations might engage in insider trading.  See also Kau, et al., supra note 45, at 33-34 (offering 
empirical evidence that “managers are more likely to listen to markets when a higher proportion of the 
firm’s shares are held by blockholders”). 
53 But see supra note 30 (showing some concern about Section 16(b)).  It may well be the SEC’s high-
handed method of developing a general rule against insider trading did not allow for such public 
expression of concern after Cady, Roberts.  Just to remind those who are unfamiliar with this history, the 
Cady, Roberts adjudication decision, interpreting Rule 10b-5, was published long after the decision as an 
administrative adjudication opinion.  It was the farthest thing from a rule-making procedure, and most 
observers at the time did not even think that there was now a new rule.  That doubt was not finally 
resolved until the Second Circuit accepted that reading of Rule 10b-5 in Texas Gulf Sulphur.  See Henry 
G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 473 (1967).  The 
SEC may well have taken this approach because they did not want public comment in a rule-making 
proceeding, nor did they want to alert Congress to the radical law making they were engaged in.  Given 
that reading of what occurred, it certainly is not surprising the business community, for the most part, 
simply let the “dictum” of Cady Roberts ride, at least until it was too late really to do anything about it. 
54 For an excellent description of internal markets for “securities” predicting future sales, success of a 
certain product, or supplier behavior in such companies as Eli Lilly, Hewlett-Packard, and Microsoft, see 
Barbara Kiviat, The End of Management?, TIME (Inside Business Bonus Section), July 12, 2004.  
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involve the use of an internally constructed mock or virtual stock market or derivatives 
markets to assess a specific population’s valuation (prediction of success) of, for 
example, a new product or managerial decision.
55  The practice is based on the 
Hayekian idea that markets are better organizers of information and predictors of the 
future than are individuals. 
 
Prediction markets in the corporate world are designed to mimic as nearly as possible 
the conditions of a real market.  Thus they work more effectively if the individuals 
betting use their own money and trade to make more money, just as in real markets.  
The idea is that people with the greatest confidence in the validity of their information 
will bet more on that supposition than will those who lack such confidence, and the 
aggregate betting will produce a “price” outcome much more accurate than any one 
individual could produce, just as Hayek suggested.
56  There are problems with getting 
the incentive structure right in virtual markets, problems that do not exist in real 
markets, but the results to date are nonetheless dramatically persuasive of the valuative 
and predictive powers of such markets.
57 
 
The similarities and overlaps between the Hayekian “use of knowledge,” virtual 
markets, and insider trading should now be apparent to anyone.  They each involve, 
actually or virtually, one and the same thing, namely a market for information.  And this 
                                                                  
55  See, e.g., KAY-YUT  CHEN  & CHARLES  R. PLOTT, INFORMATION  AGGREGATION  MECHANISMS: 
CONCEPT, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR A SALES FORECASTING PROBLEM (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Soc. 
Sci. Working Paper No. 1131, 2002).  The paper discusses, among other issues, the question of whether 
the prediction-market mechanism can identify knowledgeable individuals and provide an incentive for 
them to participate, id. at 8-9, a problem which does not exist in a real legal market for inside information.  
See also AJIT KAMBRIL & ERIC VAN HECK, MAKING MARKETS: HOW FIRMS CAN DESIGN AND PROFIT 
FROM ONLINE AUCTIONS AND EXCHANGES 149-155, 159-61 (2002) (discussing how prediction markets 
can aid corporate decision-making); Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Spring 2004, at 107 (summarizing academic literature on prediction markets). 
56 See also JAMES SUROWEICKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 23-39 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of 
diversity of beliefs among the participants in a virtual or a real market for the “magic” of the aggregation 
of disparate valuations to work).  This is another reason why the exclusion of insiders from the stock 
market guarantees a less efficient market than would exist otherwise. 
57 Readers are most apt to be familiar with the Iowa Electronic Markets for betting on political 
campaigns.  These have proved to be considerably more successful than any polling device for predicting 
the outcomes of American elections.  See Iowa Electronic Market Website, at http://www.biz.uiowa/iem 
(last visited ___).  The use of prediction markets made headlines a few years ago when the Department of 
Defense DARPA office tried to use a virtual market to predict terrorist activities.  A popular outcry that 
this allowed “betting” on terrorism and carried moral hazards forced DOD to cancel the project.  See 
Robin Hanson & Ryan Oprea, Manipulators Increase Information Market Accuracy 2 & n.2 (July 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/biashelp.pdf (last visited 
___).  
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market inevitably performs far more successfully than would most any non-market 
administrative process, whether the latter be socialist central planning, marketing 
surveys by polls, or mandated financial disclosures such as required by the SEC.   
Certainly it should be clear now why corporate managers and others with a real interest 
in managerial efficiency would not have complained about insider trading when it was 
widely recognized as a standard practice.  Their jobs were – and still are – much 
simplified with a free and open information market for all possible participants.
58  There 
never was any need, therefore, to include insider trading in executive compensation 
packages.
59  Even in this day of regulated, distorted, and corrupted information flows, 
the smart managers must still keep a weather eye out for unexpected changes in their 
company’s stock price.
60   
 
The illustrations used above are considerably oversimplified and describe a kind of 
event that does not occur every day. In fact, the truly dramatic case of important 
information being conveyed almost instantaneously by the stock price may be one of the 
rarer events in a top manager’s career.  Even so, there would not have to be many such 
occasions, experienced directly or only heard about, before managers would understand 
the desirability of having insider-trading influenced stock prices available. So managers, 
directors, and large shareholders may have had little or no incentive ever to talk about 
                                                                  
58 So much for the argument that it would be “unfair” if an office boy, a janitor, or a secretary were 
allowed to trade on information that was fortuitously picked up while on the job.  Cf. United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding liable a law firm partner not personally representing the company 
whose options and shares he traded).  Management’s interest would be just as great in having these low 
functionaries trade on new information as the highest level executive, so long as their trading added to the 
accuracy of the stock’s price.  It’s reliable price-effect information they are after, not some puerile ideal 
of “fairness.” This is not to say, of course, that there may not be situations in which it will be in a 
company’s interest to delay information reaching the market, say where this would be valuable mainly to 
competitors.  In such a case, however, we could expect the managers to take whatever steps were 
appropriate to guard the information and not to rely on a general rule against insider trading to cure a 
rarely occurring problem. 
59 This is not to say, however, that there may not have been special cases where inventors or other 
entrepreneurs were explicitly allowed, as part of their compensation package, to trade on the value of the 
information they produced.  This might have been especially appropriate to cover such cases as 
pharmaceutical scientists working on new drug products and betting on their success.  A company could 
then get the advantages of a prediction market with the additional advantages of an appropriate form of 
incentive compensation.  This is not the same as a generalized argument for insider trading as part of all 
compensation packages, which, as we have seen, entails considerable operational problems.  
60 It is an open question just how much SEC regulation has distorted the market for valuable information, 
and the matter has not been addressed by empirical research.  Still, we do know that enforcement of 
insider trading laws is spotty and ineffective, but whether it is ineffective enough that we still have 
substantially as reliable and accurate a market for information (net of all the administrative costs of the 
system) as we would in the absence of the regulation is anyone’s guess.  
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insider trading as an important managerial tool and certainly none to condemn it.  A 
culture of silence on the subject seems the most likely result.  The mystery posed earlier 




PART IV – THE WRAPUP 
 
There are arguments against this new hypothesis in support of legalized insider trading.  
First, there is the practical point that the stock market is notoriously volatile, and a 
manager may be hard pressed at any give moment to know whether the stock price 
change he is witnessing is a result of informed trading or of so-called “noise” trading.
61  
“Noise” will significantly complicate the task of ferreting valuable insights out of a 
stock’s price, and on occasion noise might make it impossible to infer any valuable 
information from a stock price.  But the ability to analyze stock price changes should 
probably be seen as another desirable skill for managers. The fact that noise may create 
some uncertainty with this kind of information and on occasion may make it useless 
certainly does not imply that this information should never be available to managers as 
well-enforced insider trading laws in effect would do. 
 
A related point is that stock markets are always subject to manipulation and that 
managers relying on stock price to gain new information will regularly be “confused” 
by others trying to convey false information.
62  While this observation seems plausible, 
it fails to note that alternative schemes of transmitting information are equally if not 
more subject to the same risks.  Even more to the point, however, this argument does 
not integrate the possibility of “counter manipulators,” who can profit by trading on the 
truth regardless of what their colleagues are up to.  All indications are that significant 
stock price manipulation is extremely difficult to manage, and, ironically, it may 
actually improve the functioning of the market.
63 This is similar to the point made 
earlier about the value of insider trading on bad news.  In both cases allowing an 
                                                                  
61 Aggregate market or industry price movements would not obviously have the same value since a 
general price level change would not implicate the kind of information we are concerned with here. 
62 For some suggestion of this kind, see Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of 
Regulation: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L 
589, 600 & nn.36-37 (2003).  Actually Levmore, in a somewhat different context, skirts near to ideas 
proposed in this paper, but he seems reluctant to acknowledge any valuable role for insider trading.  Id. at 
588-89. For important studies of the problem of manipulation, see Robin Hanson et al., Information 
Aggregation and Manipulation in an Experimental Market, 56 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. (forthcoming 
2005); Robin Hanson, Foul Play in Information Markets (Jan. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author), available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/foulplay.pdf (last visited ___). 
63 See especially Hanson & Oprea, supra note 57. Levmore also notes that profits can be made by counter 
manipulators and that ultimately an equilibrium may develop. Levmore, supra note 62, at 601.  
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unfettered market in information will have salutary effects unheard of in connection 
with regulatory “disclosure.” 
 
There is a special advantage that virtual markets have over real markets powered by 
informed trading.  They can be carefully tailored to a very specific query such as “how 
will a particular new product fare in the market?”  A generalized market for all 
information, like the stock market, cannot normally perform with this degree of 
specificity, but on occasion its message will be specific and clear.  The fact that this is 
not always the case is simply one of the conditions of the marketplace; it is not a 
drawback to insider trading as such. 
 
Of course, since the argument for allowing insider trading presented here is brand new 
and largely theoretical, we have little direct empirical or even anecdotal evidence to 
support it.  However, we do have a rapidly growing number of reports of experimental 
work in prediction markets, none of which, needless to say, involve actual trading of 
stocks on a stock exchange. And a number of new questions for exploration come to 
mind.   Do managers follow their company’s stock price with an obsession suggesting 
that it contains really valuable information for them (above and beyond their own direct 
interest in stock-price-related compensation plans)?  Do we have any evidence that 
problems have actually been discovered through this mechanism?  Are there other 
factors that would make stock price monitoring a losing proposition, such as noise, 
unreliable data, more efficient alternative information-transfer devices, or excessive 
time or other costs associated with the practice?   
 
Even after the SEC began its in terrorem campaign against insider trading and required 
compliance officers nearly everywhere, few top executives of large corporations have 
made ferreting out insider trading a top priority of their administrations.  In other words, 
though the silence on the topic has not been as complete as it was before Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, complaints about the practice have still not been deafening.  Most of the roar 
comes from the SEC and its supporters in the academic and media worlds.  So, we 
might wonder, does this signify acquiescence by the corporate elite in the SEC’s  
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campaign against insider trading or does it merely mean that the campaign has been 
mainly bluster and headlines with an extraordinarily low enforcement capability?
64  
 
All of these are interesting questions that may be asked about the Hayekian hypothesis 
for insider trading.  Possibly a new area of scholarly research has been opened.  The 
hypothesis seems to have enough “bite” that it will have to be integrated into the general 
argument about insider trading that continues to rage.  If the issue were a close one 
before this notion appeared, this could tip the balance, and we may even begin to see 
some advocacy of insider trading legality from those whose interest, professional or 
academic, is in making the management of large companies more efficient. 
 
                                                                  
64 Ajeyo Banerjee & E. Woodrow Eckard, Why Regulate Insider Trading? Evidence from the First Great 
Merger Wave (1897-1903), 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1329 (2001); Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider 
Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Javier Estrada & J. Ignacio Peña, Empirical Evidence on 
the Impact of European Insider Trading Regulation, 20 STUD. ECON. & FIN. 12 (2002); David Hillier & 
Andrew P. Marshall, Are Trading Bans Effective? Exchange Regulation and Corporate Insider 
Transactions around Earnings Announcements, 8 J. CORP. FIN. 393 (2002); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, The Effect of 
Regulation Changes on Insider Trading, J. BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 93 (1974) H. Nejat Seyhun, The 
Effectiveness of Insider Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & ECON. 149 (1992); Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading 
Laws Work? (Feb. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
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PART V – CONCLUSION 
 
Stock trading by any informed individuals can produce information that may be 
extremely valuable to managers of publicly-held companies.  This may result in benefits 
that are even greater than those that were claimed for insider trading as a device to make 
the stock market more efficient.  That older argument related efficiency of capital 
markets almost entirely to activities stock-market activities such as investing, stock 
trading, or transactions in control.
65  Now we have added a corporate-governance 
dimension to the insider trading debate. Indeed when we view the topic in Hayekian 
terms, it is hard to escape the conclusion that knowledgeable trading in an earlier era did 
and probably still does aid considerably in the functioning of the large corporate system.  
And a new question arises whether virtual markets can provide a meaningful alternative 
to overt legal insider trading, if indeed regulation of that trading has even significantly 
reduced its informational benefit. 
 
There is a lot of evidence that insider trading simply went underground
66 and that no 
substitute is really needed. SEC enforcement of its rules is a mess.  It is arbitrary, 
capricious, political, and extremely inefficient.  Nonetheless illegal insider trading, no 
matter how robust, is bound to be more expensive and less efficient than the legalized 
variety, and so it is not surprising that other devices might arise for surmounting the 
SEC’s effort to hold back this tide.   If the actual stock market cannot be used to gain 
certain information because of insider trading restrictions, then managers (though, alas, 
not outside investors) can create a virtual market to provide some of the same 
information.  Virtual markets even have some benefits lacking in the actual stock 
market, such as the ability to segregate out specific causes of share-price changes.  But 
virtual markets can never be a complete substitute because of the design and 
motivational problems mentioned earlier. But they can ameliorate some of the costs of 
the SEC’s campaign against insider trading, and we can expect them to flourish.
67 
                                                                  
65 However, the efficient market concept also has some relevance for the executive compensation debate.  
See Carlton and Fischel, supra note 14. 
66 See supra note 64. 
67 At least until the SEC decides that a virtual market operated with real money is close enough to the real 
thing to merit regulation.  For some possible foretaste of this, see SEC v. SG, Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 
2001) (ruling that trading in shares of “fantasy” companies on the Internet – perhaps easily distinguished 
from a prediction market – is still covered by the federal securities laws). 